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This  paper  explores  the  characteristics  of  238  patents  on  94  “inventions” 
contributed by major multinational innovators to the “Eco-Patent Commons”, which 
provides  royalty-free  access  to  third  parties  to  patented  climate  change  related 
innovations.  By  comparing  the  pledged  patents  to  other  patents  in  the  same 
technologies or held by the same multinationals, we investigate the motives of the 
contributing  firms  as  well  as  the  potential  for  such  commons  to  encourage 
innovation  and  diffusion  of  climate  change  related  technologies.  This  study, 
therefore, indirectly provides evidence on the role of patents in the development 
and diffusion of green technologies. More generally, the paper sheds light on the 
performance  of  hybrid  forms  of  knowledge  management  that  combine  open 
innovation and patenting.  
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1.  Introduction 
Numerous well-known economists have called for policies to encourage both public and 
private investment in technologies designed to mitigate climate change (Mowery et al. 
2010; David et al. 2009; Krugman 2009; Arrow et al. 2008). As Nordhaus (2009), among 
others, points out, policy in this area confronts a double externality problem: the first is 
private underinvestment in R&D due to partial lack of appropriability and imperfections in 
the financial markets and the second is the fact that climate change mitigation and 
reduction in greenhouse gases is a classical public good, and one with a substantial 
international component. That is, the benefits of climate change mitigation flow largely to 
those who do not bear the costs. Hall and Helmers (2010) argue that the existence of the 
second externality can impact the desirability of policies designed to deal with the first 
externality, shifting policy makers’ preferences towards subsidies and away from 
intellectual property (IP) protection.  
To make this argument more explicit, consider the usual policies designed to close the gap 
between the private and social returns to an activity.4 These are subsidizing (or issuing tax 
credits for) the activity, regulating the activity (mandating its performance or controlling 
the price of inputs), and internalizing the externality by granting property rights that allow 
some appropriation of the social benefits. In the case of R&D investment, the first approach 
has been widely used in the past for research directed towards national needs (Mowery, 
2010), for corporate R&D via tax credits, and for small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) that face credit constraints. Although the second approach has been used much less 
(and is probably less suitable for R&D activities due to their uncertainty and the difficulty 
of such micro-management), examples are the mandate of the State of California for sales of 
electric-powered automobiles (Kemp, 2005) and the U.S. federal government stimulus 
package, which mandates the diffusion of electronic medical records and their effective use 
(Blumenthal, 2009).  
The most widely available policy designed to encourage private R&D investment in most 
countries is the intellectual property system. However, in the case of climate change 
mitigation (as in the case of R&D directed toward other national needs), allowing firms to 
appropriate social benefits via their market power and pricing behavior has the drawback 
that without further policy design, it will tend to inhibit the diffusion of the technologies 
whose creation it encourages. In addition to the welfare cost of limited diffusion, IP 
protection also has potential negative consequences for subsequent innovation that builds 
                                                        
4 We note in passing that in the case of climate change, formidable incomplete information problems and the global 
nature of needed policies make the simple “market failure” analysis and corresponding policy predictions not as 
useful as they might be in other areas. However, the question of the proper role of IP protection in the case of 
climate change-related technologies still remains.   
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on the protected technologies. Given the environmental externality, such diffusion and 
follow-on innovation is highly desirable. This has triggered an active debate on the role and 
usefulness of IPRs in the generation of climate change related innovation and its diffusion.5 
The existing evidence suggests that the IP system, specifically the patent system, may not 
be the optimal policy to encourage R&D in this area.  
A number of large multinational firms such as Sony, IBM, Nokia, etc., appear to have 
recognized the problem with patents in the area of climate change related technologies and 
as a response, have created an “Eco-Patent Commons” (henceforth EcoPC) together with 
the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (http://www.wbcsd.org). Firms 
pledging patents to this commons are required to sign a non-assertion pledge which allows 
third parties royalty-free access to the protected technologies. The official purpose of this 
private initiative is described on the EcoPC website as the following: 
•  To provide an avenue by which innovations and solutions may be easily shared to 
accelerate and facilitate implementation to protect the environment and perhaps 
lead to further innovation. 
•  To promote and encourage cooperation and collaboration between businesses that 
pledge patents and potential users to foster further joint innovations and the 
advancement and development of solutions that benefit the environment. 
Obviously, one can imagine an additional purpose: to improve the reputation and public 
relations of the participating firms, possibly by contributing patents on inventions of little 
value and the donation, therefore, generating little cost to the firm. Alternatively, the 
patents contributed could be those on inventions that need development effort that the 
firms in question are not willing to undertake. To date, there are 12 participating firms, and 
121 patents have been contributed to the commons.6 Relative to the size of these firms’ 
patent portfolios, this is a small number; however, it could be large given the small share of 
directly climate-change related patents in these firms’ total patenting.7  
                                                        
5 For a review of the relevant literature see Hall and Helmers (2010). 
6 More precisely, the EcoPC website lists 121 patent numbers. These 121 patent numbers correspond to 90 
equivalent groups containing 94 unique priorities, and the total number of equivalent patents is 238. Precise 
definitions of these are given later in the paper. The firms that have contributed to date are Bosch, Dow, 
DuPont, Fuji-Xerox, IBM, Mannesmann, Nokia, Pitney Bowes, Ricoh, Sony, Taisei and Xerox. Note that the 
patent owned by Mannesmann was absorbed and pledged by Bosch, but we nevertheless treat Mannesmann 
as a separate entity in our analysis. The EcoPC announced on July 1 2010 that Hewlett Packard (HP) has 
joined the commons. Yet, we omit HP in our analysis as our core data predates HP’s entry into the commons. 
7 In fact, the 94 unique priorities accounted for by these patents are 0.02 percent of the priorities claimed by 
these firms between 1989 and 2005. The share ranges from 0.12 percent for DuPont to negligible for Ricoh, 
Sony, Nokia, and FujiXerox.  
Hall-Helmers  5  June 2011 
The question that we ask is whether the EcoPC initiative achieves its ambitious official 
objectives. In order to provide an answer to this broad question, we answer a range of 
intermediate questions: (a) are the patented technologies indeed climate-change related? 
(b) Are the patents that protect these technologies valuable? (c) Will royalty-free access to 
the EcoPC patents lead to more diffusion of the protected technologies and the generation 
of sequential innovations than otherwise? In particular question (c) is interesting in light of 
the broader debate on the role of IP in the diffusion of climate-change related technologies. 
The EcoPC initiative provides a unique opportunity to study what happens to technology 
diffusion if valid patent protection is effectively removed from the pledged technologies.  
The question of whether the EcoPC scheme achieves its objectives is directly linked to 
firms’ underlying motivations to pledge their patents to the EcoPC. As will be explained in 
detail in Section 2, firms maintain ownership of their pledged patents, which implies that 
they have to bear the recurrent costs associated with patent ownership in the form of 
renewal fees. It is, therefore, far from obvious which benefits accrue to firms from the 
EcoPC scheme that outweigh the direct (e.g., renewal fees) and indirect (e.g., management 
time) financial costs associated with keeping pledged patents in force. Therefore, 
understanding firms’ motives to pledge and keep patents in force sheds light on the 
effectiveness and sustainability of the commons as a hybrid form of appropriation in 
addressing both the knowledge and environmental externalities involved in climate change 
related innovation. 
To answer these questions, the present paper explores the characteristics of the patents 
that have been contributed to the EcoPC and compares them to two other sets of patents: 
1) patents held by the pledging firms that are not donated to the commons and 2) a 
randomly drawn set of patents in the same technology (which also share priority year and 
authority with EcoPC patents). The first comparison sheds light on the question of where 
these patents fit in the firms’ patent portfolios and hence give some indication on firms’ 
underlying motivations to pledge these patents. Whereas the second informs us about how 
the value of these patents compares with other patents that protect similar technologies 
and that have not been donated to the commons. This comparison also provides 
information on the impact of the commons on technology diffusion and its potential to 
induce follow-on innovation by third parties. 
However, given the short amount of time the EcoPC has been in place, some of the answers 
will be of tentative nature; we nevertheless believe that a detailed study of the pledged 
patents will provide insights into the open innovation-patenting relationship in the climate 
change technology area, insights that may also be useful in other areas where open 
innovation exists side-by-side with IP protection. In particular, we provide insights into the 
ability of such hybrid private initiatives to address the double externality problem present 
in climate change related innovation.   
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We begin the paper with a discussion of the history and detailed operation of the eco-
patent commons. Section 3 describes the data used in our analysis. Section 4 reviews 
different theoretical motivations for firms to pledge their climate change related patents. 
Section 5 provides a descriptive analysis of the characteristics of the EcoPC patents and 
Section 6 discusses the corresponding regression results. Section 7 discusses our approach 
to investigating the effect of the non-assertion pledge on technology diffusion and 
innovation and shows the results of our analysis. Section 8 concludes. 
2.  The Eco-Patent Commons 
The creation of the not-for-profit initiative EcoPC is quite recent, in January 2008. It was 
established by IBM in cooperation with the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD) and it allows companies to pledge patents that protect green 
technologies. Companies as well as individuals can join the commons by pledging at least 
one patent.8 Any patent is welcome that protects a technology that confers directly or 
indirectly some environmental benefit – so-called green patents. “Green” is defined by a 
classification listing IPC subclasses that are considered to describe environmentally 
friendly technologies.  Yet, there appears to exist considerable flexibility as long as a 
pledging firm can show some (direct or indirect) environmental benefit of the pledged 
patent. In fact, as we show later, many of the patents contributed appear to be directed 
towards mitigating environmental damage from manufacturing, but not specifically 
towards climate change mitigation.  
“Pledge” in this context means making patents available for use by third parties free of 
charge,9 although the ownership right remains with the pledging party which distinguishes 
the EcoPC from conventional patent commons. This also implies that the non-assertion 
pledge cannot be treated as a patent donation and hence the pledged patent is not 
deductable from a company’s taxable income. Potential users do not have to specifically 
request a license; any pledged patent is automatically licensed royalty-free provided it is 
used in a product or process that produces some environmental benefit.  
While a pledge is in principle irrevocable,10 there is a built-in mechanism to safeguard a 
pledging firm’s business interests which is called “defensive termination”. This means that 
                                                        
8 According to the “Ground Rules” 
(http://www.wbcsd.org/web/projects/ecopatent/EcoPatentGroundRules.pdf), also “any worldwide 
counterparts” to the pledged patent are considered to be subject to the non-assertion pledge, i.e., any 
equivalents to the pledged patent. 
9 Third parties comprise anyone interested in the patented technology and not only other firms that are part of the 
commons.  
10 The “Ground Rules” (http://www.wbcsd.org/web/projects/ecopatent/EcoPatentGroundRules.pdf) 
stipulate that “[a] patent approved for inclusion on the Patent List cannot be removed from the Patent List,  
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a pledging firm can “terminate” the non-assertion pledge if a third party that uses a pledged 
patent asserts its own patent against the pledging company. The possibility to invoke 
“defensive termination” does not apply to other pledging firms in the commons unless the 
primary IPC of the asserted patent is on the commons IPC classification list. The fact that 
companies retain ownership rights also means that they have to bear the cost of 
maintaining the IP right, that is, they must pay any fees required to keep the patent in 
force.11 
The initial members of the commons when it was launched in January 2008 were IBM, 
Nokia, Pitney Bowes, and Sony. In September 2008, Bosch, DuPont, and Xerox joined. Ricoh 
and Taisei entered the commons in March 2009 and Dow Chemical and Fuji-Xerox in 
October 2009. Its newest member, Hewlett Packard (HP) joined in July 2010, but is 
excluded from our analysis because our core data are as of April 2010 and thus predate 
HP’s entry into the commons. All patents pledged to the EcoPC are listed in an online data-
base (the data base is reproduced in Appendix A1). 
The EcoPC is currently the only initiative of this type, although Creative Commons in 
collaboration with Nike and Best Buy is setting up the Green Xchange initiative. In this new 
initiative (in contrast to the EcoPC), pledging firms can choose whether to charge a fixed 
annual fee for the use of a pledged patent. Contributing firms can also selectively deny 
other firms the use of a pledged patent. In addition, registration of users of contributed 
patents is mandatory. As a matter for future research, it would be interesting to investigate 
whether the difference in institutional design of the Green Xchange has any effect on the 
achievement of the objective that both commons share. 
To reiterate the official objective of the EcoPC laid out in the Introduction: the EcoPC aims 
to promote the sharing of climate-change related technologies and thus to assist in 
environmental protection for the common good. The initiative targets green patents that 
are neither used nor represent “an essential source of business advantage” to their owners. 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
except that it may be deleted for so long as the patent is not enforceable.” However, firms obviously can 
withdraw from the commons at any point in time, although even in this case “[v]oluntary or involuntary 
withdrawal [from the commons] shall not affect the non-assert as to any approved pledged patent(s) the non-
assert survives and remains in force.” 
11 When a patent is applied for at the EPO, renewal fees must be paid to the EPO beginning the third year counted 
from the date of filing until the patent is granted. Once the patent has been granted, renewal fees have to be paid to 
the national offices separately in which the patent has been validated. Renewal fees at the EPO currently vary 
between EUR 420 and EUR 1,420 depending on how long the application has been pending (see Supplement 1 to 
OJ EPO 3/2010). Renewal fees in national offices vary substantially, as of August 2010, for example in the UK, fees 
increase during the 20 years of patent validity from GBP 70 to GBP 600, whereas in Germany, fees increase from 
EUR 70 to EUR 1,940. Maintenance of a patent family can thus be quite costly if annual fees have to be paid at 
several patent offices. Contrary to the EPO and European national offices, at the USPTO, renewal fees are not 
payable annually. At 3.5 years, the maintenance fees due amount to US$ 980, at 7.5 years to US$ 2,480 and at 11.5 
years to US$ 4,110.  
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Hence, the commons does not ask firms to sacrifice patents of particular business value for 
the common good. It should, therefore, attract those patents that are neither “worked” nor 
confer a strategic value to the company even as a “dormant” property right (see also 
Section 4). The initiative endeavors to emphasize potential business benefits for firms from 
participating in the commons: it can serve as a way of diffusing a technology and 
potentially lead to new collaboration and business opportunities. But most importantly, 
participation in the scheme guarantees broad public visibility considering the great deal of 
(mostly positive) attention in the press the initiative has received so far (NY Times 31 
October 2009; Wall Street Journal 14 January 2008; WIPO Magazine April 2009) and 
innumerable postings and discussions in blogs and climate-change/open-innovation online 
forums. 
However, a number of these press articles and blog postings contest the value of the 
initiative. For example, the Wall Street Journal (14 Januray 2008) notes that the 
environmental benefit is not obvious for some of the EcoPC patents. As a case in point, the 
press article provides the example of a patent pledged by Pitney Bowes “that protects 
electronic scales from being damaged when they are overloaded.”12 In a review of the 
EcoPC initiative, Srinivas (2008) lists a number of problems with the initiative. He asserts 
that the technologies protected so far by patents in the EcoPC “have a very limited 
application in the further development of technologies in key sectors.” However, he does 
not provide any proof for this assertion. Related to this, he claims that more important 
players in the market for climate-change related technologies have to join the commons in 
order to make it an effective tool for the dissemination of relevant technologies. He is also 
skeptical that simply providing royalty-free access to single green patents will have a 
significant impact on the diffusion of green technologies as most technologies are covered 
by multiple patents which are not included in the commons. Cronin (2008) argues in her 
article in Greenbiz13 that the patents contained in the EcoPC are of little value as they 
protect outdated technologies. She also asks the natural question of why private companies 
would give something valuable away for free. In order to make the EcoPC more valuable, 
Cronin suggests that it should include novel non-patented inventions that have not been 
made public before, presumably because they were protected via (trade) secrecy. This 
could be done inexpensively in the form of defensive publications, which are currently not 
part of the EcoPC.  
However, the issue is even more puzzling, because firms actually pay to provide royalty-
free access to their patents. As pointed out by Bucknell (2008) in an article for Think IP 
                                                        
12 This patent is a bit of an exception. It seems that overload is likely to cause damage to the load cell, a core 
component of highly sensitive and accurate electronic scales. The invention, therefore, avoids the need for frequent 
replacement of the load cell and hence helps avoiding environmental waste. 
13 www.greenbiz.com  
Hall-Helmers  9  June 2011 
Strategy,14 firms could instead allow a patent to lapse by simply not paying renewal fees 
and to communicate to the public that the main motivation for doing so is to allow third 
parties access to the invention and hence to spur its diffusion. The relevant question, 
therefore, is why firms would find it worthwhile to offer non-exclusive royalty-free licenses 
to a set of patents while simultaneously incurring the cost of keeping them in force? Why 
not simply allow the patents to lapse, effectively publishing the contents defensively? Is the 
value of possible defensive termination against future threats that large? 
In the academic literature, so far, only Van Hoorebeek and Onzivu (2010) discuss the EcoPC 
initiative. They regard it as a private response to calls by mostly developing countries for 
increased climate change related technology transfer. As such, the EcoPC initiative may 
help deflect increasing pressure exerted by developing countries to apply TRIPS provisions 
including compulsory licensing or even denying patent protection to specific climate 
change related to technologies. But for this strategy to be viable, patents pledged under the 
EcoPC initiative should protect enforceable and “valuable” technologies, an assumption 
that Van Hoorebeek and Onzivu (2010) do not investigate in their qualitative discussion. 
More generally, there has been some discussion in the strategic management literature on 
patent pledges in the context of software. Alexey and Reitzig (2010), for example, argue 
that firms may choose to pledge patents to mould the wider appropriability regime that 
governs their business activity. Using software patents as an example, the authors argue 
that firms which stand to profit from the open source software concept through the 
production of complementary assets, such as IBM and Nokia, choose to unilaterally pledge 
patents in order to create an appropriability regime conducive to the open source 
movement. The establishment of a patent commons would seem consistent with this 
reasoning as it would enable firms to address the collective action problem involved in 
shifting the appropriability regime. Since the EcoPC firms are not major players in the 
market for green technologies, shifting the appropriability regime governing green 
technologies might thus even be beneficial as it could harm potential competitors and 
induce sales of complementary assets provided by EcoPC firms. Nevertheless, the 
assumption underlying this argument is again that firms pledge “valuable” patents. 
Biotechnology, a research field in which IP protection of key technologies appears to have 
detrimental effects on innovation (Lei et al., 2009), offers another example of a similar 
initiative: the BiOS (Biological Open Source) initiative by the not-for-profit institute 
CAMBIA. In the case of BiOS, firms may use patented technologies royalty-free but agree to 
“share with all BiOS licensees any improvements to the core technologies as defined, for 
which they seek any IP protection” and “agree not to assert over other BiOS licensees their 
own or third-party rights that might dominate the defined technologies” (Jefferson, 2006: 
                                                        
14 www.thinkipstrategy.com  
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459). The strength of this initiative appears to rest largely on the value of the IP rights 
available under BiOS licenses. 
In summary, the EcoPC initiative provides an institutional design that allows easy access to 
patented technologies, which may confer some direct or indirect climate change related 
benefits. It is, however, far from obvious whether the pledged patents protect any valuable 
green technologies as the motives for firms to pledge valuable green patents and keep them 
in force are not clear-cut. 
3.  Data 
The data appendix A describes in detail how we created our EcoPC dataset and control 
samples. We started with the list of 121 patents contributed to the EcoPC by the 12 
contributing firms which is available on WBCSD’s website.15 We then used the April 2010 
edition of EPO’s PATSTAT to draw the following samples of patents: 
1.  All of the patents with the same set of priority documents as the EcoPC patents, 
i.e., all EcoPC equivalents.16 
2.  Control (1) sample: all patent applications worldwide that were made by the 12 
EcoPC firms. 
3.  Control (2) sample: all patent applications worldwide in the same IPC class as 
one of the EcoPC patents (which also share the same priority year and authority 
as an EcoPC patent). In addition, we restrict this sample to patents applied for by 
firms (i.e., not by individuals/public research institutions). 
A number of complications arose in performing these tasks. First, PATSTAT is based on 
published applications, whether or not the patents have been granted. This is an advantage 
because most of our EcoPC patents are of fairly recent date and may not yet have been 
granted. However, not all US applications are published at 18 months, especially in the 
earlier part of our sample. Even if they are published, it appears that some firms leave the 
assignment of ownership off the application until the patent issues, so we will not find all 
the patent applications that correspond to a given firm. When we use a matched control 
sample later in the paper (Section 7), this is no longer a problem because in that case we 
are able to verify the owner(s) manually.  
                                                        
15 Some of the patent numbers given on WBCSD’s website were incorrect. We retrieved the correct numbers either 
by searching for the patents using the patent titles indicated on the website or by obtaining the information directly 
from contacting WBCSD. We thank Kana Watanabe at IBM’s Corporate Environmental Affairs for assisting in the 
retrieval of the missing information. 
16 The priority years range from 1989 to 2005, so we restricted the matching samples Control (1) and Control (2) to 
those years.  
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A second problem is missing priorities. Many of these patents have multiple equivalents, 
which are patents applied for in several jurisdictions on the same invention. We prefer to 
perform our analysis using only a single observation for each “invention,” preferably the 
priority application. However a large number of patents are missing priorities and in this 
case we simply allowed the patent to serve as its own priority. This may mean that we 
effectively keep the patent as a single patent with no equivalents. We have checked this 
assumption using the equivalents data constructed by Dietmar Harhoff and co-workers and 
found that it introduces very little error into the data.17  
A related problem is that some applications have multiple priorities and some patents 
serve as priority patents for multiple applications to the same authority, making the 
assignment of a unique priority application to each application problematic. Although these 
problems afflict only a minority of applications, they do exist for a subset of our EcoPC 
patents. For example, US priority patent application 57503704 from 2004 serves as a 
priority patent for 9 US patent applications. Of these 9 applications, 2 have an additional 4 
priority patents at the USPTO in 2004, and 7 have one additional priority patent, also at the 
USPTO in 2004. Not surprisingly, the assignee for all these patents is DuPont Corporation, a 
chemicals firm: the pattern of multiple interlocking priorities is much more common in 
chemicals than elsewhere. Our solution to this problem is to define an invention as an 
equivalent group of patents and to use the earliest priority application as the priority 
patent.18 In the case described above, there are two groups, one consisting of the first 2 
applications, which share a common priority set (US 2004 53681904, 54997804, 
57503704, 58478504, and 53745304), and one consisting of the second 7, which also share 
a common priority set (US 2004 57503704 and 58478504). Thus although there are 94 
unique priorities among the eco-patents, there are only 90 unique equivalent groups. Table 
1 shows the various counts for both the EcoPC patent and the control samples. 
Ideally we would like to study these patents at the level of unique inventions, i.e., priorities. 
However, owing to the missing priority problem identified above and the overlapping 
priorities which implies that families, i.e., equivalent groups, are the correct unit of analysis 
(and introduces a new problem of identifying a unique priority patent for each family), we 
are not able to do this. In the analysis that follows, we choose to solve this problem by 
occasionally presenting results that use all 238 of the EcoPC patents, but weights the 
observations by the inverse of the equivalent group or family size, effectively down-
                                                        
17 All the additional equivalents for our EcoPC patents that were found this way were for unpublished patent 
applications, which are not in our sample. See http://www.inno-tec.bwl.uni-
muenchen.de/forschung/forschungsprojekte/patent_cit_project/index.html for the equivalents data. 
18 Note that our definition is essentially the same as the first (equivalents) definition in Martinez (2010). See also 
Appendix A2 for more details.   
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weighting those patents that have many incarnations. We also cluster the standard errors 
by equivalence group, to allow for within-group correlation of the errors.  
Finally, PATSTAT´s April 2010 version does not provide information on the legal status of a 
patent. It can be inferred from a patent’s publication kind code whether it has been 
granted; however, if a patent has not been granted, it is difficult to infer whether the patent 
application has been rejected, lapsed, or is simply still pending. Moreover, there is no 
information on whether renewal fees have been paid. This made it necessary to collect 
information on patents’ legal status manually from EPO’s INPADOC, USPTO PAIR, and the 
various national patent offices (see data appendix A). 
4.  Which patents do firms pledge? 
Figure 1 shows schematically the decision tree of a firm contemplating “working” a patent 
or abandoning it and its decision to pledge the patent to the EcoPC. 
 Figure 1: Firm’s decision tree 
 
Unfortunately, we only observe some of these decisions. Among the four final outcomes (a - 
no patent, b - work the patent, c - pledge the patent, d - neither work nor pledge the patent), 
we observe only c and the combination of b and d. This limits our ability to build a 
structural model of the decision process. Conditional on patenting, we can, however, 
conjecture the following based on our discussion in Section 2:  
1.  The firm is more likely to work the patent if it is valuable to the firm, if more 
resources were invested in acquiring it, and if it is related to the firm’s own line of 
business or technology expertise.  
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2.  The firm is more likely to pledge a patent if it is environmentally friendly, if it is less 
related to the firm’s own line of business or technology expertise, and if it is not 
suitable for licensing.  
Taken together, this suggests that a firm’s pledged patents will be less valuable to the firm, 
more “green”, and less related to the firm’s patent portfolio. We might also expect that 
these patents are less likely to be prosecuted aggressively if they have not yet issued, and 
that they are less likely to remain in force. If firms (ab)use the commons purely for public 
relation motives, we would expect to see pledged patents to lapse, i.e., not to be in force, 
shortly after entering the EcoPC because presumably most PR benefits are reaped at the 
moment when the pledge is announced.  
Hence, while a firm’s decision to `work’ a patent remains unobserved, we can nevertheless 
deduce from the characteristics of the pledged patents themselves (notably their legal 
status) as well as relative to other patents held by the same firm or patents in the same 
technology field what a firm’s underlying motives for pledging patents are and hence what 
type of patent from a firm’s patent portfolio is pledged. 
5.  Descriptive Statistics 
In this section of the paper we present some basic information about the patents 
contributed to the commons: their ages, legal status, priority authorities, family sizes, the 
technology areas, and the firms contributing. In combination with the regression analysis 
in Section 6, this allows us to address the first two questions posed in the introduction: are 
the patented technologies indeed climate-change related? Are the patents that protect 
these technologies valuable? 
Table 1 shows a breakdown of the composition of the different samples. It shows that we 
have 238 unique patent applications in the EcoPC, which correspond to 94 unique 
inventions/priorities.  The table displays also the corresponding figures for the two control 
samples. Table 2 shows the number of patents contributed by each of the 12 firms. The first 
panel shows all the patents and their equivalents, a total of 238 patent applications, and the 
second panel shows the unique 90 equivalence groups that correspond to these patents.  
Table 2 shows that the donated patents are a tiny share of the firms’ portfolios (less than 
0.1 per cent) and that the majority of the patent families (76 out of 90, or 84 per cent) have 
been contributed by just four firms: Bosch, DuPont, IBM, and Xerox. In appendix Table A3 
we show that in almost all cases the priority patent was applied for at the USPTO, the 
German patent office, or the JPO, and in most cases at the office corresponding to the 
headquarters of the applicant. Table 2 also shows the date that each firm entered the 
commons; to the best of our knowledge this is also the date that all their patents were  
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contributed. The dates are all quite recent, so we have only two to three years to observe 
these patents after donation, with the inevitable consequence that our analysis will be 
preliminary, but we believe it is useful to set the stage for subsequent analysis performed 
after some more time has passed. 
Table 3 gives a rough idea of the technologies that have been contributed. This table is 
based on a reading of the abstract and written description of these patents, with a special 
focus on the description of the problem to be solved, in order to determine their likely 
application. Two related observations about the data in this table suggest themselves: first, 
only slightly more than one-third of these patents fall into classes that are designated as a 
clean technology class by the OECD-EPO definition (Johnstone et al., 2010).19 Second, many 
of them seem to be related to environmental cleanup or clean manufacturing, and only 
tangentially to mitigating the effects of global climate change.20 
The ages of the contributed patents at the time of their donation vary widely. A few are old 
and nearing the end of their life, but many have substantial statutory life remaining (Figure 
2). Age is measured as the exact date the owning firm joined the commons less the exact 
priority date of the patent. In general, the statutory life of the patents will be twenty years 
from the date of application (which often coincides with the priority date), and we find a 
range from 3 years to 20 years, with a peak at 4 years of age. This is suggestive, as most 
patents are granted by the time the application is four years old, and this age also 
corresponds roughly to the time when some uncertainty about potential value of the 
invention is likely to have been resolved (Lanjouw et al., 1998).21 In Figure 3, we show the 
priority year distribution of the contributions as a share of the 12 firms’ patents (Control 1 
sample) and also as a share of patents in the relevant IPC classes (Control 2 sample). Both 
are roughly flat but with high variability, and an observable increase in contribution rates 
in the years 2004 and 2005.  
One of the questions raised in Section 2 was whether and why firms would pay to keep a 
patent in force once it was contributed to the commons. Because many of the donations are 
quite recent, it is difficult to observe whether firms have chosen to pay renewal fees on 
their patents after they have been donated. It is also the case that many of these patents 
have not even been granted as of February/March 2011. In Table 4, we look at the legal 
                                                        
19 The relevant IPC classes are available at  
http://www.oecd.org/document/55/0,3343,en_2649_34333_43383927_1_1_1_1,00.html 
20 There is one patent for which we could not ascertain the environmental benefit. The patent is entitled `Image 
Forming Device’ and has the objective ` [t]o prevent a user from getting into a dangerous situation caused by fault 
and breakage due to use exceeding the working limit of a cartridge.’ 
21 EPO patents typically take longer to grant than four years, but are relatively underrepresented in our 
sample, which consists primarily of USPTO, German patent office, and JPO patent applications and grants.   
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status of all the equivalent patents where we have collected the data manually from the 
relevant patent offices as described above (as of February/March 2011). It appears that 
almost half of these patents have been granted and are still in force, 2.5 per cent are 
pending, and 40 per cent are withdrawn, rejected by the relevant office, lapsed or have 
expired.22 Looking at the weighted shares, 64 per cent are in force, about 2 per cent are 
pending, and 28 per cent are not in force. So in fact it does appear that in some cases the 
applicants have chosen to abandon the donated patents before their statutory term has 
expired, or have chosen not to prosecute them aggressively. However, the difference in the 
weighted results suggests that in many cases, at least one of the equivalents is still in 
force.23 Additional information is shown in Table A4 in the Appendix, which provides a 
breakdown of the data by pledging company. Table 5 shows that the firms are more likely 
to maintain the patents in the US, Germany, or at the EPO, and less likely in other 
jurisdictions. Table 5 also shows the legal status of a matched control sample of patents in 
the same technology classes as the EcoPC patents which is discussed in more detail in 
Section 7. The comparison confirms that USPTO patents are far more likely to be 
maintained in force than patents from other jurisdictions. It also shows that the share of 
patents in force is considerably larger for the EcoPC sample, 70 per cent of the priorities 
pertaining to unique equivalent groups are still in force relative to 38 per cent in the 
control sample. 
The descriptive statistics provided in this section suggest that a substantial share of EcoPC 
patents have been granted and are maintained in force. In any case, most patents that enter 
the commons are young and most of their statutory lifetime remains. The technologies 
covered by the EcoPC patents appear to be climate change related, although this is a matter 
of interpretation as the OECD clean technology definition categorizes only a third of the 
EcoPC patents as climate change related. We also showed that the EcoPC patents account 
for tiny shares in EcoPC firms’ patent portfolios. Considering the size of the patent 
portfolios held by firms such as IBM or Sony, this is hardly a surprising result. 
6.  Characteristics of donated patents 
In this section of the paper, we take a look at the characteristics of the EcoPC patents and 
compare them to our two control samples, first using univariate analysis and then via 
                                                        
22 As best we can determine, the NA category corresponds to those patent applications that have not yet been 
examined by the relevant office, either because they are newer, or, in some cases, because examination was 
not requested by the applicant. The patent offices concerned are Japan, Russia, and Mexico. 
23 In fact, 16 of the 90 equivalence groups have no patent that is still in force, 56 have one such patent, and 18 have 
more than one.  
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multivariate probit regressions. The characteristics we look at are the usual bibliometric 
statistics available in patent data: 
•  The number of inventors listed on the application, which is related to the amount of 
resources invested in the invention. This variable is occasionally missing from 
PATSTAT, and we add a missing value dummy when that is the case.  
•  The family size as given by DOCDB, which is a proxy for the value of the invention. 
•  The number of citations received worldwide by April 2010, another proxy for value, 
and for diffusion. 
•  The number of references to other patents, which may be related to the extent to 
which this invention is derivative of others. 
•  The number of references to the non-patent literature, a proxy for closeness to 
science. 
•  The number of IPCs in which the patent has been classified, sometimes used as a 
proxy for the scope or breadth of the invention. 
We also include a dummy that indicates whether the patent falls in one of the OECD green 
technology patent classes (Johnstone et al. 2010). Finally, when comparing our patents to 
the others held by the contributing firms, we include a measure of their similarity to the 
other patents in the firm’s portfolio. This measure is the sum of the relative frequency of a 
patent’s IPC codes in the firm’s portfolio. It ranges from zero to 0.79; higher values 
correspond to higher similarity.  
Table 6 shows the means, standard deviations, minima, and maxima of these variables for 
the EcoPC patents and the two control samples. The table also shows a simple t-test for 
differences in the means, and a nonparametric ranksum test for differences in the 
distributions of each variable across the samples. Compared to the other patent 
applications by these firms (Control 1 sample), EcoPC patents have more inventors, a 
larger family size, more backward citations, more non-patent references, are classified in 
more IPCs, and are much more likely to fall in the OECD green technology classes (not 
surprisingly). However, they have the same pattern of forward citations, suggesting that 
the knowledge they contain is not diffusing faster than that of the patents retained by the 
firms. They are also clearly more distant from the firm’s portfolio than the other patents. 
Compared to patents in the same classes (Control 2 sample), however, the EcoPC patents 
have smaller family sizes, but more forward and backward citations. They are also 
classified in many fewer IPCs, suggesting that they are narrower than other patents in 
these classes.  
Table 7 takes a multivariate look at the difference between EcoPC patents and the other 
patents applied for by the 12 EcoPC firms. This table shows the results of a probit 
regression for the probability that a patent is an EcoPC patent as a function of the patent  
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characteristics, the priority year, dummies for the one-digit IPC, and dummies for the four 
leading firms (Bosch, DuPont, IBM, and Xerox). The standard errors for these regressions 
are grouped by equivalence group, and we also present the same regressions weighted by 
the inverse of the group size for comparison. The results are quite similar. The EcoPC 
patents are clearly more likely to be green-tech patents and to be far from the firm’s 
portfolio of technologies. They also have a larger family size, suggesting that they were 
viewed as more valuable by the firm at the time of application. Finally, they have more 
backward citations which suggests either that they are somewhat derivative, or that they 
are in a crowded technological field.  
Table 8 performs a similar exercise using the second control sample, patents in the same 
IPCs as the EcoPC patents, i.e., comparing patents protecting in principle similar 
technologies. For this probit regression, weighting by the size of the patent family does 
make a difference. The unweighted results are similar to those for the first control sample: 
EcoPC patents have more backward citations, fewer IPCs and are more likely to be green. 
The weighted regression also suggests that they are more valuable than a random patent 
from the class, with more inventors and a larger family size.  
The following section investigates whether pledging the property rights has had a 
discernible impact on the diffusion of the protected technologies. 
7.  Technology Diffusion and Follow-on Innovation 
The descriptive statistics and the regression analysis described in Sections 5 and 6 above 
suggest that EcoPC patents protect relatively valuable, climate change related technologies. 
The ensuing question is whether pledging these patents has had an impact on the diffusion 
of the protected technologies and has spurred the development of new innovation which is 
based on the pledged patents.  
Empirical Approach 
There are at least two challenges in assessing the effect of the commons on diffusion and 
innovation. First, diffusion in terms of application of the protected technologies in question 
cannot be captured. According to the rules of the EcoPC, third parties are allowed to use 
pledged patents without signaling this to the patent owners. Hence, if a third party applies 
an EcoPC patent in a process or product, we are unable to observe this unless the third 
party cites the EcoPC patent in a patent application aimed at protecting the new process or 
product. It is important to emphasize that this may substantially undermine our ability to 
investigate the impact of the non-assertion pledge on pure diffusion without additional 
innovation for which patent protection is sought. Second, we observe patents for at most 
three years after they have been pledged, which is a relatively short amount of time that  
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the inventions protected by these patents have been freely accessible. Considering the 
possible long lag time in the development of new technologies based on existing patents 
and the common 18 month period between application and publication date, this may limit 
our ability to find patents that build on the EcoPC patents after they have entered the 
commons. To mitigate this problem, we have augmented the PATSTAT April 2010 citation 
data with data manually collected from Espacenet as of February 2011.  
Mindful of these limitations imposed by data availability, we resort to a difference-in-
difference type research design to investigate the question of diffusion. We observe all 
patents before and after they have been pledged and therefore analyze whether there are 
statistically significant differences in the pattern of forward citations these patents receive 
before and after they entered the commons. If royalty-free access has had an impact on 
diffusion of these technologies, we would expect to see a statistically significant increase in 
the forward citations that the EcoPC patents have received subsequent to their pledge. As a 
control group, we use the set of patents in the same technology classes as the EcoPC 
patents. The unit of observation is therefore cites per patent per citation lag, where the lag 
is measured by the number of years between the priority dates of the citing patent and the 
cited patent. Most of the values of this variable are quite small (about 80 per cent are zero) 
so we use Poisson regression with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and 
clustered on the patent for estimation.  
The model that we estimate is specified as follows: 
   ~
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    + [1 −          ] ×      × [1 +   ×     ≥    ]
                +          ×      × [1 +   ×     ≥    ]                      = 1,…,17 
where cit is the number of citations received by patent i at citation lag t, i.e., the difference 
between a patent’s priority date and the priority date of the citing patent, and αip are a set 
of dummies for the patent priority date (between 1989 and 2005).24 The dummy variable 
          is equal to one for EcoPC patents and zero for the control patents. We control 
for the citation lag distribution for the two samples separately using quadratics in the lag: 
 
2
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The δ and γ functions allow the overall shape of the citation lag distribution to differ 
between EcoPC patents and the controls. Finally, the dummy variable     ≥     is equal to 
                                                        
24 These dummies are included to allow for the fact that there is lag truncation, so some lags have fewer cites simply 
because there are fewer patents old enough to have cites with that lag.   
Hall-Helmers  19  June 2011 
one after the establishment of the commons, i.e., when patents are pledged to the EcoPC.25 
The effect of entry into the EcoPC is thus captured by the semi-elasticity ρ, which gives the 
average per cent change in forward citations following entry in the commons.  
So the   coefficients inform us about the “pledge effect” in terms of forward citations. The 
main problem with estimating this model is that the dummy variable         is unlikely to 
be strictly exogenous. For example, if more forward citations made it less likely for a patent 
to be pledged to the EcoPC, the assumption of exogeneity of the right hand side variables 
would be violated and our estimate of the “pledge effect” biased. In future, we might be able 
to correct for this problem using the results in the previous section on the characteristics of 
pledged patents relative to the firms’ overall patent portfolios and a control function 
approach to estimating the Poisson regression. 
Citation data and regressions 
The citation data used for the regressions that follow are constructed by collecting all the 
forward citation records for the EcoPC patents and their controls including cites to their 
equivalents from Espacenet (as of February 2011). For this part of the analysis, we draw a 
subsample from our Control 2 sample to match the sample of EcoPCs as closely as possible 
based on patents’ priority year, publication authority and IPC codes. The subsample, 
therefore, provides a set of control patents that is closest to the EcoPC patents in terms of 
the type of protected technology, the age of a patent, and in which jurisdiction/market it 
protects an invention. Moreover, the reduced sample size allows us to rely on the most 
recent available citation data from Espacenet, which has to be collected individually for 
each patent record from the Espacenet website. 
In the analysis below we use two versions of the citation data thus created: the first is by 
patent application including the equivalents (238 EcoPC patents and 473 controls) and the 
second is by the family or set of equivalents (90 EcoPC and 94 controls). We verified that 
we do not double count citations by checking the equivalent sets of citing patents. For 
example if patents A and B cite patent C, we verify that A and B are not equivalents. Before 
doing analysis on the second dataset we collapse the citations within each equivalence 
group, to avoid double counting them. That is, if the equivalence group contains patent A, 
cited by patent C, and patent B in the same equivalence group is also cited by patent C, this 
yields only one citation, from C to the group (A, B). 
Table 9 shows the number of patents and equivalent groups that receive any citations 
during the 1989-2010 period as well as the total number of citations received. The table 
shows that nearly 35 per cent of EcoPC patents received any forward citation whereas only 
                                                        
25 Obviously we do not have such a date for the controls, so we have used the date of the establishment of the EcoPC 
(2008) for them.  
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25 per cent of the patents in the control sample did. If the unit of analysis is an equivalence 
group, the pattern changes: the shares of EcoPC and control equivalent groups that receive 
any citations are nearly the same with 70 and 68 per cent respectively. This change reflects 
the simple fact that EcoPC patent applications have fewer equivalents and are therefore 
more likely to be the cited application. Table 9 also shows average citations for both 
groups. The figures reveal that the EcoPC patents have on average more citations when we 
look at all patents, but have fewer citations when the unit of analysis is the equivalence 
group, for the same reason as above.  
Appendix Table A5 shows the distribution of average citations received by citation lag. 
Citation lags are defined as the difference between the priority dates of the citing and the 
cited patent. This measure can be interpreted as the age of the patented technology at the 
point in time it was cited. The first panel of Table A5 shows the distribution of citation lags 
using a patent as the unit of analysis as opposed to an equivalence group as shown in the 
second panel of Table A5. The distribution of citation lags ranges from 0 to 17 where this 
range differs by patent according to its priority date.  
In the first panel, Columns (1)-(3) show the number of average citations for each citation 
lag for both EcoPC and control patents. As should be expected, the average citation counts 
drop considerably as the lag size increases, which means that patents receive on average 
less citations the older they are. The citation lag distribution of the EcoPC sample appears 
to be skewed to the right relative to the control sample, i.e., average citation counts are 
larger for low citation lags with the largest differences for citation lags of 2-4 years. Non-
parametric (ranksum and Kruskal-Wallis) tests also strongly reject the null hypothesis of 
equal citation lag distributions. Columns (4) and (5) show the average citations before and 
after patents have been pledged to the commons, which makes clear that there are few 
forward citations after patents have been pledged.  
Table 10 shows the results of the Poisson regressions for citations as a function of the 
priority year, citation lag and EcoPC patent status (the first column is by equivalent group 
and the second by patent). Both reach similar conclusions. Note that in both cases the 
parameter μ, which measures the post-2008 effect for the control sample, was 
insignificantly different from zero, suggesting that there is no overall change to the cite lag 
distributions after 2008, so we imposed μ=0 in the results shown. Although the controls 
and the eco-patents have significantly different citation lag distributions overall, the post-
entry effect for the eco-patents is insignificantly different from zero in both columns. Figure 
4 visualizes the different citation distributions for the control and EcoPC samples. The 
figure shows that the forward citation distributions are indeed very similar for the EcoPC 
and control patents. For both groups, the average number of cites drops considerably over 
time with there being very few cites after the establishment of the commons, so we can 
conclude that the data are insufficient at the present time to answer the question, although  
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as time passes and more citations are received by both sets of patents it will be interesting 
to look at this question again. 
8.  Conclusions 
Are firms dumping valueless patents without any apparent applicability in mitigating 
climate change into the commons only to reap good publicity? Or is royalty-free access to, 
in fact, valuable and green patents a promising way to promote the diffusion of climate-
change related technologies?  
Our answer to the first question is a qualified `No’. Pledged patents appear to be climate-
change related, albeit more in form of environmental cleanup or clean manufacturing. 
Judging by some indicators of a patent’s value, such as family size, the EcoPC patents are 
more valuable than the average patent held by pledging firms and comparable patents 
protecting similar technologies. However, they tend to be more derivative of previous 
technologies and somewhat narrower than other patents in their class, suggesting that they 
are not for very radical inventions. Because they are usually distant from the firm’s 
technology (patent) portfolio, one reason for donating them maybe that they are not very 
valuable to the firm holding them. In spite of this, pledging firms also appear to maintain at 
least one patent of a patent family in force after it has been pledged by paying the renewal 
fees. 
However, our answer to the second question regarding the commons’ potential to enhance 
diffusion of the protected technologies is even less conclusive. Our analysis suggests that 
pledging these patents, that is making them available to third parties royalty-free, has no 
discernible impact on the diffusion of the knowledge embedded in the protected 
technologies to other patenting firms. However, given the short period of time after the 
patents have been pledged that is available so far, our results are naturally of preliminary 
nature but invite further scrutiny in the near future. 
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10.  Data Appendix 
A 1: List of Patents contained in Eco Patent Commons 
#  Description  Number  Equivalents  Pub Auth  Company  IPC 
1 
Fuel injection valve for internal combustion 
engine, with actuator acting via needle 






WO60232  Germany   Bosch   B05B001-08 
2 
Fuel injection valve for internal combustion 
engine, with actuator acting via needle 





WO60232  Germany   Bosch   B05B001-08 
3 
Fuel injection valve for internal combustion 
engine, with actuator acting via needle 





WO60232  Germany   Bosch   B05B001-08 
4 
Fuel injection valve for internal combustion 
engine, with actuator acting via needle 





US6575385   Germany   Bosch   B05B001-08 
5 






US6755073   Germany   Bosch   G01N011-16 
6 






US2003217589   Germany   Bosch   G01N011-16 
7 






US6755073   Germany   Bosch   G01N011-16 
8 






US6755073   Germany   Bosch   G01N011-16 
9 






JP2004519695   Germany   Bosch   G01N011-16 
10 
Climate control system in vehicle with 





US2006081355   Europe   Bosch   B60H001-00 
11 
Climate control system in vehicle with 





US2006081355    Germany  Bosch   B60H001-00 
12 
Climate control system in vehicle with 





US2006081355    Korea  Bosch   B60H001-00 
13 
Climate control system in vehicle with 








States  Bosch   B60H001-00 
14  Apparatus for removing contaminants from  EP1070555     Europe   Xerox   B09C  
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a contaminated area  
15  Image Forming Device   JP3375028     Japan   Ricoh   G03G 
16  Method for recycling optical disks   JP3528898     Japan   Sony   B01D 
17  The purification method and purges of 
shallow water regions  
JP3561890 
   Japan   Taisei   C02F 
18  Metallic reflection film recovering device of 
disklike information recording M medium 
and its metallic reflection film recording 
method  
JP3704899 
   Japan   Sony   B01D 
19  Method and device for extracting 
groundwater using high vacuum  
JP3095851 
EP498676, 
US5172764   Japan   Xerox   E03F 
20  Recycling of disk-like information   JP3855377     Japan   Sony   B08B 
21  Flocculating agent and a method for 
flocculation  
JP3876497 
   Japan   Sony   B01D 




DE69510746   Japan   Xerox   B09C 
23 
Process for removing contaminants and 




DE69612321   Japan   Xerox   B09C 
24  Device for extracting contaminated 
material from discharged stream and 
method thereof  
JP3971480  US6024868, 
EP792700  Japan   Xerox   B09C 
25  The constructing method of the artificial 
green space of the watersides  
JP4015958 
   Japan   Taisei   E02B 
26 
Fuel supply system and tank assembly for 




US5197444   Germany   Bosch   F02D033-00 
27 
Fuel supply system and tank assembly for 




US5197444    Brazil  Bosch   F02D033-00 
28 
Fuel supply system and tank assembly for 




US5197444    Japan  Bosch   F02D033-00 
29 
Fuel supply system and tank assembly for 






States   Bosch   F02D033-00 
30  Hydraulic drive for sheet metal forming 
machine  
DE4218952 
   Germany   Bosch   B03B015-18 
31  Channel-scanning cordless telephone 
appts. with microprocessor- begins 
scanning with particular radio channel 
assigned to mobile and base stations 







Germany   Bosch   H04B007-26 
32  Channel-scanning cordless telephone 
appts. with microprocessor- begins 
scanning with particular radio channel 
assigned to mobile and base stations 







Germany   Bosch   H04B007-26 
33  Channel-scanning cordless telephone 
appts. with microprocessor- begins 
scanning with particular radio channel 
assigned to mobile and base stations 






Germany   Bosch   H04B007-26 
34  Channel-scanning cordless telephone 
appts. with microprocessor- begins 
scanning with particular radio channel 
assigned to mobile and base stations 







Germany   Bosch   H04B007-26 
35 
Method of anisotropically etching silicon 






States   IBM   H01L  














States   IBM   B23K  
37 
Process for two phase vacuum extraction 






States   Xerox   E21B 
38 













States   IBM   C11D 
39 
Process and Apparatus For Groundwater 












States   Xerox   E21B 
40  Apparatus for two phase vacuum 




States   Xerox   E21B 
41 
Catalyst Method for the Dehydrogenation 










States   Dow  B01J 
42  Chemical pre-treatment and biological 
destruction of propylene carbonate waste 
streams effluent streams to reduce the 





States   IBM   C02F 
43  Solvent stabilization process and method 





States   IBM   B08B 
44  Supported Catalyst for Dehydrogenation of 
Hydrocarbons and Method of Preparation 




States   Dow  C07C 
45 
Process and apparatus for high vaccum 







States   Xerox   E03B 
46  Packaging system for a component 
including a compressive and shock-




States    IBM     G03C 
47  Apparatus and process for treating 




States   Xerox   B09B 
48 








States   Xerox   E03B 
49 









Bowes   G01G  
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50 




States   IBM   C02F 
51  Method for treating photolithographic 
developer and stripper waste streams 
containing resist or solder mask and 




States   IBM   B01D 
52 
Magnetic Refrigerant Compositions and 










States   Xerox   G03G 
53 
High vacuum extraction of soil 





DE69505179   Europe   Xerox   E02D 
54 
Highly sensitive method for detecting 








States   DuPont   C12Q, C12N 
55 
Lyophilized bioluminescent bacterial 









States   DuPont   C12Q, C12N 
56  Method for treating photolithographic 
developer and stripper waste streams 
containing resist or solder mask and 




States   IBM   B05C 
57 




States   IBM   B05C 
58  Vacuum application method and apparatus 







States   Xerox   E21B 
59  Fluid jet impregnating and coating device 




States   IBM   C07C 
60  Process for recovering high boiling solvents 
from a photolithographic waste stream 
comprising less than 10 percent by weight 




States   IBM   G06F 
61 
Air flow control circuit for sustaining 
vacuum conditions in a contaminant 







States   Xerox   C02F 








Bowes   G07B 
63 






States   Xerox   B09B 





States   IBM   G03F 
65  Photoresist develop and strip solvent 




States   IBM   B08B 
66 
Method and apparatus for ozone 




States   IBM   C07C 
67 
Process for recovering high boiling solvents 
from a photolithographic waste stream 
comprising at least 10 percent by weight of 




States   IBM   F01N 
68  Catalytic reactor   US6210862  US2002177072,  United  IBM   G03F  
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US6576382   States  
69 




States   IBM   C03C 
70  Method of etching molybdenum metal 




States   IBM   C23G 





States   IBM   B24C 
72  System for cleaning contamination from 




States   IBM   C02F 
73  Removal of soluble metals in waste water 





States   IBM   G03C 
74 
Method for deterring drive voltage of fuel 








States  Bosch   F02D041-20 
75 
Method for deterring drive voltage of fuel 






US2002046734   Germany  Bosch   F02D041-20 
76 
Method for deterring drive voltage of fuel 






US2002046734    UK  Bosch   F02D041-20 
77 
Method for deterring drive voltage of fuel 






US2002046734   Japan  Bosch   F02D041-20 
78 
Method for deterring drive voltage of fuel 






US2002046734  France   Bosch   F02D041-20 
79  High-aspect ratio resist development using 




States   IBM   B08B 
80  Cleaning method to remove flux residue in 




States   IBM   G03F 
81 




States   IBM   B44C 
82  Cellular Arrays for the Identificaiton of 





States   DuPont   C12Q 
83  Method for recycling a disk having a 




States   IBM   B08B 
84  Semi-aqueous solvent based method of 




States   IBM   G06K 
85  Apparatus and method for reusing printed 




States   IBM   B65D 
86  Method to accelerate biodegration of 
aliphatic-aromatic copolyesters by 




States   DuPont   C08G, C08J 
87  Systems and methods for recycling of cell 





States   Nokia   H04B 
88  1,1,1,2,2,4,5,5,5- Nonafluoro-4-
(Trifluoromethyl)-3-Pentanone Refrigerant 
Compositions Comprising a 





States   DuPont   C09K 
89  1,1,1,2,2,4,5,5,5- Nonafluoro-4-
(Trifluoromethyl)-3-Pentanone Refrigerant 
Compositions Comprising a Hydrocarbon 





States   DuPont   C09K 
90  1,1,1,2,2,4,5,5,5- Nonafluoro-4- US7338616  US2005263735,  United  DuPont   C09K  
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(Trifluoromethyl)-3-Pentanone Refrigerant 
Compositions Comprising a 
Hydrofluorocarbon and Uses Thereof  
US7074343   States  
91 
1,1,1,2,2,3,3,4,4- Nonafluoro-4-
Methoxybutane Refrigerant Compositions 
Comprising Functionalized Organic 















States   DuPont   C09K 
92  1,1,1,2,2,3,3,4,4- Nonafluoro-4-
Methoxybutane Refrigerant Compositions 





States   DuPont   C09K 
93  Protecting exhaust gas conducting parts of 
IC engine  
DE10211152 
   Germany   Bosch   F02B005-02 
94  Electric current generator for motor vehicle   DE10214614     Germany   Bosch   H02K007-116 
95  Mapping route in navigation system   DE102004022265  EP1593937   Germany   Bosch   G01C02-34 
96  Production of a filter element of a particle 
filter for an internal engine  
DE102004028887 
WO2005123219   Germany   Bosch   B01D039-00 
97  Production of region of filter structure for a 
particle filter  
DE102004035310 
WO2006008209   Germany   Bosch   B01D039-20 
98  Device for fuel-saving through electrical 
energy management controls load(s)  
DE102004038185 
   Germany   Bosch   H02J001-00 
99  Filter for removing particles from a a gas 
stream  
DE102004044338 
WO2006027289   Germany   Bosch   B01D046-24 
100  Equalizing process for Lambda values of 
engine cylinders  
DE102005005765 
   Germany   Bosch   F02D041-14 
101  Varnishing unit, especially for valve 
housing  
DE102005006457 
WO2006122587   Germany   Bosch   B05B005-08 
102  Filter device, for an exhaust system of an 
internal combustion engine  
DE102005006502 
   Germany   Bosch   F01N003-021 
103  Exhaust gas sooty particles filter for diesel 
internal combustion engines  
DE102005035593 
   Germany   Bosch   B01D046-02 
104  Device for energy supply to hybrid motor 
vehicle  
DE102005042654 
WO2007028755   Germany   Bosch   B60K006-04 
105  Particle filter for e.g. diesel engine   DE102005046051     Germany   Bosch   F01N003-28 
106  Illuminated emergency exit sign, for a 
building  
DE202004012616 
   Germany   Bosch   G09F013-18 
107  Motor cable with ferromagnetic casing  DE19963301  US2001020542   Germany   Bosch   H01B005-18 
108  Motor cable with ferromagnetic casing  US2001020542   DE19963301   Germany   Bosch   H01B005-18 
109  Particle filter bag for use in internal 
combustion engine  
DE102005042207 
   Germany   Bosch   F01N003-022 
110 
Hydrofluorocarbon Refrigerant 







States   DuPont   C09K 
111  1,1,1,2,2,4,5,5,5-Nonafluoro-4-
(Trifluoromethyl)-3-Pentanone Refrigerant 
Compositions Comprising a 




States   DuPont   C09K 
112  Wastewater Treatment Process   JP4140449  JP2004351379   Japan   Fuji-Xerox   C02F 
113 









States   Fuji-Xerox   C02F 
114  Improved process and apparatus for high 
vacuum groundwater extraction  
EP0622131 
US5464309, 
US5358357,  Europe   Xerox   B09C  




Vertical isolation system for two-phase 








States   Xerox   E21B 
116  Vertical isolation system for two-phase 





DE69612321   Europe   Xerox   B09C 
117  Improved apparatus for high vacuum 
groundwater extraction  
EP0775535 
   Europe   Xerox   B09C 
118 





DE69714101   Europe   Xerox   B09C 
119  Improved process and apparatus for 
groundwater extraction using a high 




JP4309626   Europe   Xerox   E03F 
120 





DE69835928   Europe   Xerox   B01D 
121  Producing particulates filter   DE102005032842     Germany   Bosch   B22F003-105 
Notes:   
1) Corrected numbers in italic red.  
2) Underlined numbers in green added by the authors to list available on EcoPC website. 
3) Data on equivalents extracted from Espacenet (http://ep.espacenet.com) 
 
 
A 2: Construction of core dataset 
The patent numbers given in Column 3 of Table A 1 are used to extract additional 
information on these Eco-Patent Commons (EcoPC) patents from the European Patent 
Office (EPO) Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) version April 2010. 
PATSTAT combines patent information from several sources: DocDB (the EPO master 
bibliographic database containing abstracts and citations), PRS (the patent register for 
legal data), EPASYS (the database for EP patent grant procedure data), and the EPO patent 
register as well as the USPTO patent database for names and addresses of applicants and 
inventors.  
In a first step, we extract from Espacenet all equivalents of the patent numbers given in 
Column 3 of Table A 1. In a second step, we retrieve from PATSTAT all patents with the 
same publication number as an EcoPC patent. In a third step, we also match the publication 
authority and keep the record in PATSTAT that is at the most advanced stage of the grant 
process as indicated by its publication kind. For example in the case of the US, if both A1 
(first published patent application) and B1 (granted patent as first publication) documents 
are available,26 we focus on the B1 document. 
                                                        
26 These definitions apply since 2001.  
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We then add a range of information covering the application, publication, IPC codes, 
applicant and inventor, priorities, and patent families as defined in DOCDB and INPADOC 
(for more information on patent families see Martinez, 2010). We also create a variable 
that marks patents that belong to the same set of equivalents. Our algorithm assigns 
patents into the same equivalent group if patents share exactly the same priority 
documents.27 We also include backward and forward citations as well as citations of non-
patent documents. Since forward citations are truncated by the PATSTAT version that we 
use, we collect in addition the most recent forward citations from Espacenet.28 We face the 
same issue in determining whether an EcoPC has been granted. Thus, we also collect the 
most recent available publication kind from Espacenet in order to create an indicator 
variable showing whether a patent has been granted. In addition, we collect manually 
information on the legal status (as of February/March 2011) of EcoPC patents from a 
various sources, including INPADOC, IPDL, KIPRIS, DPinfo, INPI, and USPTO PAIR.29 
                                                        
27 We also assign patents to the same equivalent set that display the following patterns: 
1)  Application_id  Priorityid_1 Priorityid_2 
A           B 
B           A 
C           A                B 
2)  Application_id  Priorityid_1 Priorityid_2 Priorityid_3 
A           B                C 
D           A               B     C 
28 http://ep.espacenet.com 
29 The information for the core dataset as well as the matched Control 2 sample was retrieved from the following 
























RU: http://ru.espacenet.com/search97cgi/s97_cgi.exe?Action=FormGen&Template=ru/ru/number.hts  
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A 3: Construction of comparison sample 1 (patents from same applicant) 
We use a list of standardized firm names of companies that have pledged patents to the 
EcoPC to extract all other patents assigned to these firms from PATSTAT. Notably, we first 
extracted all assignee names available in PATSTAT and then filtered the nearly 37 million 
entries for the names of our EcoPC firms. This approach ensured that we caught all patents 
held by our firms regardless of the different ways in which firms names are entered into 
PATSTAT – we found that for some of our firms, PATSTAT included several hundred 
different ways in which the names are entered. We extract the same range of information 
on these control patents as for the core EcoPC patents except for their legal status (see 
description in A 2). 
A 4: Construction of comparison sample 2 (patents with same (i) priority 
authority, (ii) priority year, and (iii) IPC) 
The second control group is selected based on a unique list of (i) priority authority, (ii) 
priority year, and (iii) IPC of the EcoPC patents. This list is used to extract from PATSTAT 
all other patents (and their equivalents) which share features (i)-(iii) with the EcoPC 
patents. In a second step, we eliminated manually all individual and non-profit assignees 
from the control sample. We extract the same range of information on these control patents 
as for the core EcoPC patents including their legal status (see description in A 2). 
 




ZA: http://patentsearch.cipro.gov.za/patents/patentsearch.aspx EcoPC patents Control1 EcoPC share Control2 EcoPC share
N of unique applications 238 684,718 0.035% 114,172 0.21%
N of unique priorities 94 398,433 0.024% 40,708 0.23%
N of applications with multiple priors 36 41,991 0.086% 25,621 0.14%
N of priors with multiple applns 47 111,173 0.042% 21,316 0.22%
N of unique appln-prior combinations 280 747,119 0.037% 184,526 0.15%
N of equivalent groups 90 394,167 0.023% 34,315 0.26%
Average family size (apps per equiv group) 2.64 1.74 3.33















DuPont Jan-08 43 40,991 0.105% 11 11,949 0.092% 3.91 3.43
IBM Jan-08 53 100,112 0.053% 29 57,199 0.051% 1.83 1.75
Mannesmann Jan-08 2 7,068 0.028% 1 2,602 0.038% 2.00 2.72
Nokia Jan-08 3 52,303 0.006% 1 12,557 0.008% 3.00 4.17
PitneyBowes Jan-08 7 4,594 0.152% 2 2036 0.098% 3.50 2.26
Sony Jan-08 4 184,178 0.002% 4 119,207 0.003% 1.00 1.55
Bosch Sep-08 52 92,121 0.056% 23 30,936 0.074% 2.26 2.98
Xerox Sep-08 56 28,494 0.197% 13 12,567 0.103% 4.31 2.27
Ricoh Mar-09 1 110,019 0.001% 1 97,139 0.001% 1.00 1.13
Taisei Mar-09 2 6,923 0.029% 2 6,770 0.030% 1.00 1.02
Dow Oct-09 9 14,908 0.060% 1 4,096 0.024% 9.00 3.64
FujiXerox Oct-09 6 43,007 0.014% 2 37,109 0.005% 3.00 1.16
Total 238 684,718 0.035% 90 394,167 0.023% 2.64 1.74
Unique equivalent groups All applications and equivalents
Table 2: Patents contributed to the commons compared to the contributing firms' portfolios
Average family size 
in datasetTechnology
Not in OECD 
sample In OECD sample Total
Not clear 1 0 1
Clean manufacturing 23 2 25
Clean up soil & groundwater 0 16 16
Electric auto related 1 1 2
Energy efficiency (mostly autos) 12 2 14
Global warming (fluorocarbons) 5 0 5
Pollution 7 8 15
Detection of environmental damage 5 0 5
Recycling (mostly disks) 3 4 7
Total 57 33 90
Table 3
Rough categorization of EcoPC technologiesNumber Share Mean Median Q1 Q3
In force 117 49.2% 10.5 10.9 6.2 13.6
Nonpayment of fees 37 15.5% 12.4 13.9 8.1 17.7
Expired 19 8.0% 17.7 18.3 17.7 18.3
Withdrawn 23 9.7% 8.3 10.9 4.3 10.9
Rejected 16 6.7% 8.4 6.2 4.4 8.5
Unexamined/Pending 4 1.7% 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.3
Published in National Office 2 0.8% 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3
NA 20 8.4% 14.3 15.7 12.8 18.2
All 238 11.2 11.0 6.1 15.8
In force 57.58 64.0% 9.2 9.4 5.8 12.2
Nonpayment of fees 10.54 11.7% 10.6 10.7 4.3 15.8
Expired 3.48 3.9% 16.8 18.1 15.8 18.3
Withdrawn 7.12 7.9% 7.8 6.6 4.7 9.9
Rejected 4.14 4.6% 7.9 6.3 4.4 8.5
Unexamined/Pending 1.59 1.8% 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.3
Published in National Office 0.34 0.4% 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3
NA 5.21 5.8% 13.9 13.5 12.4 17.7
All 90 9.6 9.4 5.7 13.2
*Age is measured on April 1, 2010, as years since the application date of the patent.
  Legal status as of February/March 2011.
Table 4: Average age in years of patent by legal status*
Unweighted












US US 20 55 73.3% 30 83 73.5%
DE Germany 22 23 51.1% 40 24 37.5%
EP EPO 18 16 47.1% 42 19 31.1%
JP Japan 19 15 44.1% 46 15 24.6%
Other 40 10 20.0% 107 67 38.5%













US US 9 42 82.4% 9 24 72.7%
DE Germany 13 11 45.8% 17 4 19.0%
EP EPO 0 1 100.0% 7 0 0.0%
JP Japan 4 9 69.2% 16 5 23.8%
Other 1 0 0.0% 9 3 25.0%
Total 27 63 70.0% 58 36 38.3%
We treat patents with missing legal status as not granted and not in force/pending
Table 5: Legal status by jurisdiction












Variable Ecopatents Other Ecopatents Other Difference Ranksum Ecopatents Other Ecopatents Other
Number of inventors 1.957 1.520 0.599 0.583 4.6 4.7 0 0 8 28
Family size 3.926 2.509 0.595 0.604 8.2 8.8 1 1 13 69
Forward citations to 2010 0.824 0.721 0.969 0.909 1.5 0.7 0 0 67 642
Backward citations 1.581 0.827 1.103 0.999 6.4 5.8 0 0 48 157
Non-patent references 0.298 0.200 0.569 0.489 7.6 2.5 0 0 25 116
Number of IPCs 4.270 3.655 0.511 0.544 3.3 3.6 1 1 15 131
D (OECD greentech class) 0.332 0.011 0.472 0.105 7.4 46.8 0 0 1 1
Similarity measure 0.051 0.133 0.070 0.115 -12.8 -13.0 0.000 0.000 0.331 0.791
D (inventors missing) 0.139 0.170 0.346 0.375 -1.0 -1.3 0 0 1 1
*Geometric mean for the first 6 variables; standard deviation of the log of the variable.
Based on 238 observations for EcoPC patents and 684,634 for other patents owned by the same firms.
T-test z-test







Number of inventors 1.957 1.991 0.599 0.635 -0.3 0.0 0 0 8 37
Family size 3.926 5.281 0.595 0.786 -5.4 -5.1 1 1 13 101
Forward citations to 2010 0.824 0.502 0.969 0.894 5.6 4.7 0 0 67 589
Backward citations 1.581 0.719 1.103 1.047 7.8 7.7 0 0 48 152
Non-patent references 0.298 0.342 0.569 0.792 -2.6 -1.4 0 0 25 163
Number of IPCs 4.270 7.457 0.511 0.727 -11.9 -10.5 1 1 14 217
D (OECD greentech class) 0.332 0.071 0.472 0.257 6.0 15.6 0 0 1 1
D (inventors missing) 0.139 0.148 0.346 0.355 -0.3 0.4 0 0 1 1
*Geometric mean for the first 6 variables; standard deviation of the log of the variable.
Based on 238 observations for EcoPC patents and 114,172 observations for others in the same classes.
Table 6: Statistics on regression variables
Simple statistics for patents owned by firms contributing EcoPC patents (priority years 1989-2005)
Simple statistics for patents in the same classes as EcoPC patents (priority years 1989-2005)
Mean* Std. Dev.* Minimum Maximum
Mean* Std. Dev.* Minimum MaximumCoefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error
Log number of inventors -0.040 0.100   -0.006 0.094   -0.012 0.092  
Log family size 0.189 0.089 ** 0.166 0.085 * 0.155 0.085 *
Log forward citations to 2010 -0.044 0.029 -0.037 0.028 -0.042 0.028
Log backward citations 0.091 0.032 *** 0.076 0.030 ** 0.082 0.030 ***
Log non-patent references -0.014 0.039 -0.010 0.038 -0.004 0.039
Log number of IPCs -0.162 0.095 * -0.121 0.092   -0.186 0.092 **
Similarity measure -2.189 0.633 *** -2.702 0.723 ***
Dummy for OECD greentech class 0.975 0.102 ***






Log number of inventors -0.002 0.077   0.038 0.072   0.038 0.070  
Log family size 0.193 0.076 ** 0.161 0.072 ** 0.144 0.072 **
Log forward citations to 2010 -0.043 0.032 -0.037 0.031 -0.040 0.030
Log backward citations 0.118 0.032 *** 0.099 0.030 *** 0.105 0.029 ***
Log non-patent references 0.018 0.051 0.019 0.051 0.016 0.050
Log number of IPCs -0.154 0.067 ** -0.118 0.064 * -0.175 0.064 ***
Similarity measure -2.440 0.561 *** -2.871 0.617 ***
Dummy for OECD greentech class 1.034 0.093 ***






Heteroskedastic standard errors, clustered by equivalence group.
Significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels.
-609.29 -658.82 -677.93










Table 7: Determinants of the probability that a firm contributes a patent to the EcoPC











yesCoefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error
Log number of inventors 0.089 0.109 0.084 0.106
Log family size 0.024 0.073   0.006 0.073  
Log forward citations to 2008 -0.045 0.033 -0.048 0.032
Log backward citations 0.133 0.028 *** 0.133 0.027 ***
Log non-patent references -0.065 0.035 * -0.071 0.035 **
Log number of IPCs -0.485 0.097 *** -0.495 0.095 ***
Dummy for OECD greentech class 0.486 0.124 ***





Log number of inventors 0.186 0.084 ** 0.180 0.083 **
Log family size 0.150 0.060 ** 0.115 0.060 *
Log forward citations to 2008 -0.048 0.035 -0.054 0.033
Log backward citations 0.144 0.032 *** 0.141 0.031 ***
Log non-patent references -0.076 0.046   -0.088 0.046 *
Log number of IPCs -0.461 0.069 *** -0.462 0.067 ***
Dummy for OECD greentech class 0.500 0.114 ***





Heteroskedastic standard errors, clustered by equivalence group.
Significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels.
-564.18 -574.87







Table 8: Determinants of the probability that a patent in an EcoPC patent class is 
contributed to the commons









Eco-patents 238 90 34.5% 67.8% 411 401
Controls 473 94 25.2% 70.2% 520 498
Eco-patents 5.01 6.57 1.73 4.46
Controls 4.37 7.55 1.10 5.30
*Average over patents with nonzero citations.
**Average over all patents
Table 9: Citation counts for EcoPC patents and controls
Total patents Share with citations Total citations
Average citations* Average citations**Table 10: Poisson estimation of the citation lag model
intercept -0.126 (0.083)   0.410 (0.380)  
linear term 0.230 (0.069) *** -0.099 (0.125)  
quadratic term -0.028 (0.006) *** -0.008 (0.007)  
intercept 0.582 (0.259) ** -0.847 (0.267) ***
linear term 0.069 (0.076) 0.096 (0.076)  
quadratic term -0.022 (0.007) *** -0.020 (0.006) ***
Test for cite lag 
distribution# *** ***
Commons entry - 





Standard errors are robust and clustered on patents. 
Significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels.
23.19 (0.000)
Coefficient (s.e.)
Cite lag quadratic for eco patents


















All pats held 







All pats held 
by eco pats 
firms Share
1989 3 671 0.447% 11,110 0.027% 4 884 0.452% 12,226 0.033%
1990 27 2,550 1.059% 27,060 0.100% 2 234 0.855% 15,519 0.013%
1991 9 801 1.124% 32,563 0.028% 1 232 0.431% 19,736 0.005%
1992 12 2,666 0.450% 32,471 0.037% 5 2,095 0.239% 20,346 0.025%
1993 13 7,548 0.172% 32,021 0.041% 1 1,058 0.095% 19,871 0.005%
1994 11 6,565 0.168% 31,550 0.035% 8 1,564 0.512% 19,280 0.041%
1995 22 8,990 0.245% 35,385 0.062% 7 2,702 0.259% 22,039 0.032%
1996 17 4,244 0.401% 38,876 0.044% 4 2,134 0.187% 23,903 0.017%
1997 13 13,093 0.099% 41,746 0.031% 9 3,792 0.237% 25,300 0.036%
1998 9 5,792 0.155% 43,655 0.021% 6 1,969 0.305% 25,552 0.023%
1999 11 7,475 0.147% 44,742 0.025% 5 959 0.521% 26,041 0.019%
2000 7 5,383 0.130% 48,938 0.014% 4 3,514 0.114% 27,078 0.015%
2001 11 19,940 0.055% 53,016 0.021% 5 8,096 0.062% 28,725 0.017%
2002 9 10,527 0.085% 46,109 0.020% 5 1,090 0.459% 25,772 0.019%
2003 6 4,666 0.129% 46,616 0.013% 3 1,454 0.206% 26,890 0.011%
2004 12 4,054 0.296% 46,653 0.026% 12 1,663 0.722% 27,832 0.043%
2005 32 5,378 0.595% 48,805 0.066% 9 875 1.029% 28,057 0.032%
2006 7 2,190 0.320% 18,459 0.038%
2007 6 895 0.670% 2,574 0.233%
2008 1 516 0.194% 1,871 0.053%
2009 0 228 0.000% 498 0.000%
Total 238 114,172 0.208% 684,718 0.035% 90 34,315 0.262% 394,167 0.023%
All applications and equivalents by year of application Equivalence groups by earliest priority year
Table A1: Patents contributed to the commons as a share of firm portfolios and patent classes
















Bosch 23 30,936 2.26 2.98 2.26 2.85 2.26 3.55
Dow 1 4,096 9.00 3.64 1.00 4.32 9.00 13.28
DuPont 11 11,949 3.91 3.43 5.73 3.71 79.09 6.31
FujiXerox 2 37,109 3.00 1.16 3.00 1.15 3.00 1.28
IBM 29 57,199 1.83 1.75 1.97 2.02 3.28 2.56
Mannesmann 1 2,602 2.00 2.72 2.00 2.56 2.00 3.35
Nokia 1 12,557 3.00 4.17 3.00 4.16 3.00 4.88
PitneyBowes 2 2,036 3.50 2.26 3.50 2.45 3.50 2.98
Ricoh 1 97,139 1.00 1.13 1.00 1.11 1.00 1.49
Sony 4 119,207 1.00 1.55 1.00 1.48 4.50 1.94
Taisei 2 6,770 1.00 1.02 1.00 1.02 1.00 1.04
Xerox 13 12,567 4.31 2.27 4.92 2.49 6.92 3.06
All 90 394,167 2.64 1.74 2.91 1.76 12.83 2.36
Average family size 
from docdb




Table A2: Patent family sizes




















DE Germany 45 18.9% 12,459 10.9% 76,727 11.2% 24 25.0% 3,547 10.3% 31,897 8.1%
JP Japan 34 14.3% 20,315 17.8% 281,703 41.1% 10 10.4% 8,912 26.0% 260,034 66.0%
US USPTO 75 31.5% 30,746 26.9% 141,319 20.6% 59 61.5% 21,679 63.2% 85,950 21.8%
Other 84 35.3% 50,652 44.4% 184,969 27.0% 3 3.1% 177 0.5% 16,286 4.1%
Total 238 114,172 684,718 96 34,315 394,167
Table A3: Patents contributed to the commons by application authority
Priority appln authority; equivalents and mutliple priorities 
removed Application authority; equivalents includedNumber Granted
Share 
granted










Bosch 52 34 65.4% 25 48.1% 23 18 78.3% 11 47.8%
Dow 9 6 66.7% 4 44.4% 1 1 100.0% 1 100.0%
DuPont 43 23 53.5% 18 41.9% 11 8 72.7% 6 54.5%
FujiXerox 6 5 83.3% 5 83.3% 2 2 100.0% 2 100.0%
IBM 53 41 77.4% 25 47.2% 29 27 93.1% 24 82.8%
Mannesmann 2 1 50.0% 0 0.0% 1 1 100.0% 0 0.0%
Nokia 3 2 66.7% 2 66.7% 1 1 100.0% 1 100.0%
PitneyBowes 7 6 85.7% 5 71.4% 2 2 100.0% 2 100.0%
Ricoh 1 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Sony 4 4 100.0% 4 100.0% 4 4 100.0% 4 100.0%
Taisei 2 2 100.0% 2 100.0% 2 2 100.0% 2 100.0%
Xerox 56 49 87.5% 33 58.9% 13 13 100.0% 10 76.9%
All 238 173 72.7% 123 51.7% 90 79 87.8% 63 70.0%
We treat patents with missing legal status as not granted and not in force/pending
Uncorrected for equivalents Priority patents only
Table A4: Patent legal status by firm contributingLag controls ecopats before after Lag controls ecopats before after
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0 0.1501 0.1513 0.151 0 0 0.681 0.400 0.400 0
1 0.1649 0.1639 0.164 0 1 0.819 0.433 0.433 0
2 0.1755 0.2647 0.265 0 2 0.862 0.711 0.711 0
3 0.1459 0.2689 0.269 0 3 0.702 0.689 0.689 0
4 0.1290 0.2479 0.239 0.0084 4 0.617 0.633 0.611 0.022
5 0.0888 0.1597 0.160 0 5 0.436 0.378 0.378 0
6 0.0749 0.1182 0.118 0 6 0.360 0.313 0.313 0
7 0.0638 0.1075 0.108 0 7 0.321 0.319 0.319 0
8 0.0539 0.1160 0.110 0.0055 8 0.293 0.258 0.242 0.015
9 0.0325 0.0930 0.087 0.0058 9 0.149 0.262 0.246 0.016
10 0.0224 0.0864 0.080 0.0062 10 0.117 0.250 0.232 0.018
11 0.0103 0.0329 0.020 0.0132 11 0.054 0.096 0.058 0.038
12 0.0000 0.0352 0.035 0 12 0.000 0.106 0.106 0
13 0.0100 0.0000 0.000 0 13 0.049 0.000 0.000 0
14 0.0303 0.0085 0.008 0 14 0.172 0.031 0.031 0
15 0.0199 0.0180 0.018 0 15 0.115 0.071 0.071 0
16 0.0072 0.0000 0.000 0 16 0.050 0 0.000 0
17 0.0000 0.0282 0.028 0 17 0 0.154 0.154 0
Total 0.085 0.130 0.128 0.0022 Total 0.424 0.363 0.357 0.0063
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 26.30 (0.000) for same distribution Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 1.27 (.260) for same distribution
Ranksum test = 5.13 (0.000) for same distribution Ranksum test = 1.13 (0.260) for same distribution
unit of analysis: equivalence group unit of analysis: patent
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